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The recognised critical importance of corporate governance, and the attention 
that  it  is  paid  today,  can  be  ascribed  to  several  factors:  sensational  financial 
scandals  (and  the  repercussions  they  have  had  for  securities  and  financial 
markets),  the  exponential  development  of  stock  option  policies,  the  information 
asymmetry that can be noted in practically every company, 
The different requests for information of the various categories of stakeholders,  
combine to strengthen the decision to adopt integrated corporate communication 
policies. 
The  concept  of  integrated  communication  highlights  a  radical  rethink  of  the 
function and role of the system of corporate information flows. 
 
Keywords:  Corporate  Governance;  Communication;  Corporate  Governance 
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1. Corporate Governance and Communication 
 
The recognised critical importance of the issue of corporate governance, and the 
attention  that  it  is  paid  today,  can  be  ascribed  to  several  factors:  sensational 
financial scandals (and the repercussions they have had for securities and financial 
markets), the exponential development of stock option policies, the information 
asymmetry that can be noted in practically every company, and more besides. To 
this we must add the gradual intensification of environmental dynamics, which has 
for  some  time  been  affecting  companies  operating  in  markets  conditioned  by 
phenomena such as globalisation, deregulation, oversupply, etc. 
This critical importance, linked to different national cultures, with their own legal 
systems and corporate traditions, demands an analysis that can explore the entire 
scope of corporate governance, thus including corporate communication. 
To start with, we should put corporate governance in context, to recover some of 
the many definitions that have been proposed over the years, and the main goal of 
this  process  will  be  to  grasp  its  repercussions  for  corporate  communication 
systems. 
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The issue of corporate governance and its importance actually goes back a long 
way: as early as 1932, Bearl and Means noted an emerging problem
1, represented 
by the growing size of companies (the traditional form of the sole proprietorship, or 
individual  company,  was  increasingly  being  joined  by  the  corporation  or  large 
company)
2.  This  growth  favoured  the  separation  between  ownership  and 
management, but at the same time it also imposed a separation between ownership 
and control. 
What is more, even if the ideas expressed do not explicitly refer to corporate 
governance (this only emerged as an autonomous and specific issue in the 1970s) 
we should also mention Zappa, who observed that ‘… in order to operate usefully 
in the long term, the company must perform a vast number of duties not only in 
relation to its employees, but also to the public in which it operates. In other words, 
the company must reconcile its own advantage with the interests of those who work 
voluntarily for the company and must yield to the demands of the common good of 
the public in the country where it operates’
3; this view reflects the Author’s own 
reasoning and concerns perfectly. 
In Coda’s eyes, a corporate governance system is ‘the sum of the structural and 
functioning characteristics of governance organs such as the Board of Directors, the 
Chairman of the Board of Directors, and supervisory boards and organs like the 
Board of Auditors and the external auditors, including relations between them, with 
the organs/exponents of the owners and with the management structure’
4.  
In an interpretation influenced by the stakeholder view, that evolving theory has 
favoured, corporate governance may therefore be summed up briefly as the sum of 
rules that govern relations between the owners of a company, to whom we must 
add all the stakeholders with an interest of whatever type in the company, and the 
management  responsible  for  running  it.  This  viewpoint  includes  among  these 
relations even those that stem from the supervisory logics of governance
5. As in 
figure  1  shows,  stakeholders  (those  who  have  some  form  of  interest  in  the 
company) may be divided into contractual (primary) and diffused (secondary). The 
former interact with the company by way of direct relations, underpinned by mutual 
contract  agreements,  while  the  latter  may  also  be  involved  as  participants  in  a 
contract but usually have an interest in the company that stems from the effects and 
the  impact  that  the  company’s  actions  may  have  for  them
6.  This  approach  is 
therefore founded on an important aspect: the stakeholder always has an interest in 
the  company  (regardless  of  its  nature),  whereas  the  latter  may  have no interest 
whatsoever in the stakeholder. 
In  a  globalised  economy,  the  echoes  of  the  scandals  are  magnified  but  – 
unfortunately – the effects are often concentrated on only a partial audience; large 
multinational companies easily establish themselves in far-flung locations around 
the planet (on the basis of economic convenience the benefits of which are stronger 
than the problems of relocating), but they equally easily abandon these locations, to 
relocate  into  new  premises  elsewhere,  with  imaginable  consequences  on  the 
national and regional socio-economic environments. 
This process, which can also make it possible to avoid sanctions handed out by 
local governments, perhaps for pathological behaviour in the governance system, 
has been criticised on all sides. In this regard, J.E. Stiglitz states that ‘it should be 
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be  cognisant  for  legal  proceedings,  where  its  judgements  can  be  enforced.  The 
company may have its headquarters wherever it deems best, but this should not 
allow it to escape its responsibilities in other jurisdictions. For this to happen, it 
may be necessary to remove the veil of secrecy that envelops large multinationals
7. 
The result is that, particularly in modern economies profoundly conditioned by 
market globalisation (which has not confirmed the hoped-for trickle-down effect
8, 
in  spite  of  the  enthusiasm  of  many  of  its  defenders),  the  issue  of  corporate 
governance and the related issue of corporate governance communication acquire 
particular significance, to protect the need for information of the stakeholders that 
define each company. 
 




Source:  adapted  from  Kim  K.A.,  Nofsinger  J.R.,  Corporate  Governance,  Pearson  Education, 
Upper Saddle River, 2004 
 
Stiglitz also notes that ‘the problem of corporate governance emerges both from 
problems of incomplete information and from the public nature of management’
9. 
And as early as 1958, J.K. Galbraith warned of the risks associated to the so-called 
‘conventional  mentality’
10  that  the  Author  noted  in  large  North  American 
corporations,  which  are  prepared  to  distort  public  perception  to  influence 
acceptability
11,  noting  that  it  ‘does  not  try  to  adapt  to  the  world  it  intends  to 
interpret, but rather to the conception that a specific audience has of this world’. 
As a result, in view of numerous factors, corporate governance communication is 
of  fundamental  significance  and  must  therefore  take  the  shape  of  a  concrete 
relationship with the publics (internal, external and co-makers) that every company 
addresses,  if  it  intends  to  establish  a  continuous  and  mutually  profitable 
relationship. 
The different demands for information of the various categories of stakeholders, 
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maintain with the different publics, combine to strengthen the decision to adopt 
integrated corporate communication policies. 
Normally,  and  in  general  terms,  we  can  see  that  while  suppliers  and  credit 
institutes are interested in an ability to meet commitments, customers are interested 
in the constant updating of the products that the company proposes, and trades 
unions are sensitive to efforts made to improve working conditions and to train and 
prepare employees, whereas local communities want to know what the company 
has done to reduce the impact of its presence (on the environment, the landscape, 
etc.). 
The  commitment  demanded  of  the  company  is  rationalised  by  integrated 
corporate communication, for example (as we will see in detail below) by preparing 
an integrated report during the final closing stage, and this is no less significant 
when corporate governance is the generic object of the communication. 
Integrated corporate communication has become more important in view of the 
growing competition and the high level of managerial (and relational) complexity 
that has conditioned the economy for some time, together with a systemic view that 
does not limit observation to a partial analysis of the contexts. 
As  Brondoni  notes,  ‘the  logic  of  integrated  communication  is  increasingly 
widespread,  because  it  meets  the  needs  of  modern  managerial  economics. 
Businesses that are most exposed to competition must adopt complex forms of 
communication which combine numerous goals and numerous tools, in order to 
develop action plans that are ‘consistent and synergetic’ in relation to a wide array 
of stakeholders that constitute the external, internal and ‘co-maker’ environment. 
The  concept  of  integrated  communication  highlights  a  radical  rethink  of  the 
function and role of the system of corporate information flows, which in concrete 
terms regards acceptance of the pre-eminence of communication in competitive 
conduct, particularly for the development of intangible factors of supply (brand, 
design, pre/after-sales services, etc.) and invisible corporate resources (i.e. Brand 




2. Corporate Governance and the Demand for Information 
 
The  extension  of  the  competitive space and the managerial repercussions this 
causes generate complex relations that the global company is obliged to build up 
and manage. It is no longer a question of managing relations with the market (in its 
commercial/commodity sense), but rather of legitimation (economic, competitive, 
financial, corporate, etc.) and of the control exercised by parties legitimated by 
precise, recognisable interests in the company.  
It is not a question of purely juridical issues (the legal affairs offices and external 
consultants that large corporations can afford, deal with matters effectively), but 
rather of issues related to reconciling different cultures, both local and corporate, to 
the coordination of employees distributed in a number of decentralised operating 
units,  to  relations  with  institutional  and private investors, scattered all over the 
world, to contacts with environmental movements and/or focus groups, and plenty 
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J. Solomon and A. Solomon
13 point out that ‘international harmonization is now 
common  in  all  areas  of  business.  For  example,  in  recent  years  we  have  been 
observed strong moves toward a comprehensive set of internationally acceptable 
standards for accounting. As a result of rising international trade and transnational 
business links, the development of internationally comparable business practices 
and  standards  is  becoming  increasingly  necessary.  The  need  for  a  global 
convergence in corporate governance derives from the existence of forces leading 
to international harmonization in financial markets, with increasing international 
investment, foreign subsidiaries and integration of the international capital markets. 
Companies are no longer relying on domestic sources of finance but are attempting 
to persuade foreign investors to lend capital. Corporate governance standardization 
is one way of building confidence in a country’s financial markets and of enticing 
investors to risk funds. We now look at several initiatives aimed at standardizing 
corporate governance at a global level’. 
From the view point of a competitive approach to the market, globalisation makes 
it  necessary  to  adopt  logics  based  on  market-based  management,  respecting 
behavioural  principles  that  require  the  reconciliation  of  the  interests  of  all  the 
stakeholders  (and  therefore  not  only  those  providing  venture  capital  and  any 
financial institutes, but also geopolitical and social communities in the areas where 
the companies are located, striving for economic and often also logistic advantage). 
In addition to which, as Brondoni notes, not infrequently ‘global networks that 
operate in enlarged competition spaces (enhancing and exploiting the intangible 
assets, i.e. brand equity, information system and corporate culture), have access to 
so extensive and sophisticated market information, that they are able to compete 
with governments in setting local development guidelines’
14. 
On the other hand, the global corporation accentuates a propensity to expand its 
own physical presence on the market when, in the context of competition that is 
now  widespread  in  the  planet  but  often  played  out  within  national  borders, 
governments, both central and local, draft their own proposals designed to attract 
investments and investors, rewarding companies that decide to establish themselves 
in the territory by granting them a benefit or a bonus (the spillover effect, to which 
companies are not insensitive). 
With the result that in the global economy, corporate organisations have to act in 
a context of complex market relations, profoundly influenced by the difficulties 
inherent in corporate governance, and often with open, ramified corporate cultures, 
that are congruous with the emerging multidimensional (managerial) environment. 
We must also take into account the fact that in the most advanced countries, the 
changes to the various national systems advocated by theory and by the markets
15, 
are outlining a process founded on internationally accepted criteria. 
Corporate  governance  breaks  down  into  a  number  of  elements  (which  some 
authors  describe  as  ‘categories’),  most  of  which  can  be  found  in  all  national 
systems  but  can  also  be  specific  to  the  local  context  –  because  of  different 
legislative set-ups (even more so than different ‘cultures’). 
The  main  elements  on  which  a  system  of  corporate  government  is  founded 
include the following: 
1.  the appointment, structure and functioning of the administrative organ and 
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2.  the rights of those contributing venture capital and the affirmation of the 
principle of impartiality in their treatment; 
3.  the communication and disclosure of information and its transparency; 
4.  the  remuneration  of  management  (including  directors  who  are  not 
shareholders and the persons appointed to fill top management positions); 
5.  the internal audit system. 
 
In relation to the now prevalent stakeholder view
16, which adopts a more open 
approach than the dated shareholder view, which now tends to be limited to less 
developed  local  contexts  (both  economically  and  legislatively), we can see that 
corporate  social  responsibility  has  gradually  acquired  a  certain  importance, 
substantiated by an interpretation based on the corporate governance system. 
Considering the importance of this issue, Salvioni noted that ‘the establishment 
of effective relationships with the stakeholders is strongly influenced by the ability 
to offer concrete, understandable, true and exhaustive answers to the stakeholders’ 
need  of  information.  In  this  sense,  the  corporate  governance  evolution  and  the 
integrated  concept  of  responsibility  (considering  legal,  economic,  social  and 
environmental  dimensions)  have  produced  a  selected  enlargement  of  corporate 
communication. In recent years, in addition to the traditional financial disclosure, 
many  other  kinds  of  reporting  have  been  divulged:  the  social  report,  the 
environmental report, the sustainability report, the corporate governance report, the 
directors and top managers’ remuneration report, the integrated report, etc.’
17. 
It is therefore absolutely indispensable to consider that, quite apart from a partial 
view  that  may  influence  any  observer,  the  issue  of  corporate  governance  goes 
beyond  narrow  legal-formal  boundaries  and  spreads  into  vaster,  more  complex 
environments, which express systemic logics (of ‘integration’) that are more in tune 
with the global market. 
Favotto  recognises,  as  one  of  the  four  interpretations  that  he  would  apply  to 
corporate governance, a ‘disclosure, voluntary disclosure that starts from reporting 
of a firm’s economic-financial results and takes it upon itself to communicate risk, 
sustainability  and  the  social  report’
18.  He  also  observes  that  ‘the  link  between 
reputation,  shared  strategy  and  voluntary  disclosure  appears  clear  and  decisive. 
This is the key that explains the investment in the social report, the experience of a 
number of companies that even communicate to the outside world the risk inherent 
in the business situation (market and credit risks, operating risks and measurability 
risk), and the attention focused on reporting business sustainability, the social and 
environmental impact, and so on.’ 
So according to Favotto, the problem of governance does not lie so much in the 
legal aspect (respect of regulations) but translates into a ‘problem of strategy, or 
reputation, on the markets compared to the various external interlocutors and the 
quality of the information that is proposed’. 
An essential aspect therefore emerges: corporate accountability, not only towards 
those who contribute to its venture capital (shareholder view) but also in relation to 
anyone who has a direct or indirect interest in the company (stakeholder view). 
Detailed studies have analysed these aspects, from the viewpoint of corporate 
social responsibility, based on the assumption that in their operations companies 
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concept  of  citizenship  has  therefore  evolved,  even  extending  to  businesses 
(corporate  citizenship)  which,  as  active  parties  in  an  environment, cannot shirk 
from respect of correct behaviour codes. What is more, corporate citizenship must 
represent  an  influential  element  that  orients the behaviour of individual players 
operating within the company itself. 
Therefore,  still  on  the  subject  of  responsibility,  we  have  to  recognise  that 
accountability (of a socio-environmental nature) is an aspect that no analysis of 
corporate governance can overlook. 
J.  Solomon  and  A.  Solomon
19  define  ‘corporate  governance  as  the  system  of 
checks  and  balances,  both  internal  and  external,  which  ensures  that  companies 
discharge  their  accountability  to  all  their  stakeholders  and  act  in  a  socially 
responsible way’. 
The purpose and scope of the document prepared by SAI-Social Accountability 
International, the International Standard of Social Accountability 8000 certification 
in 2001, states that: 
 
□ ‘This standard specifies requirements for social accountability to 
enable a company to: 
a) develop, maintain, and enforce policies and procedures in order to 
manage those issues which it can control or influence; 
b)  demonstrate  to  interested  parties  that  policies,  procedures  and 
practices are in conformity with the requirements of this standard. 
The requirements of this standard shall apply universally with regard 
to geographic location, industry sector and company size’
20. 
 
In  any  case  it  remains  unavoidable  to  consider  integrated  corporate 
communication as the essential tool to construct and maintain congruous relations 




3. Integrated Corporate Governance Communication Tools 
 
In  consideration  of  our  earlier  comments,  corporate  governance  systems  are 
influenced by the corporate culture, but they are also inescapably bound by national 
legislation.  This  makes  the  commitment  demanded  of  a  global  company  more 
burdensome because, as such, it operates on a number of growing local markets 
that are subject to domestic legislation. 
The goals of this article do not include a comparative analysis of common law 
and civil law, even though the two systems have peculiar characteristics that affect 
the trading markets and are also influenced by them. Nonetheless we can certainly 
say that, in recent years, the law-makers of continental Europe have been inspired 
by their observation of British ‘rites’
21. 
However, in relation to the obligation to adapt to legislation, in the case of a 
multinational company, there is a significant option between: 
1.  a network based on distinct corporate entities which, as such, are subject to 
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a precise strategic choice can result in listing on two or more stock markets 
(cross-listing), which further accentuates obligations in terms of corporate 
governance; when, as frequently happens, only the parent company is listed 
on  a  single  market,  foreign  stakeholders  may  be  able  to  benefit  from 
legislation that is more advanced than that of the individual countries where 
they reside or have their registered offices; 
2.  a network structure of local branches, which are without legal autonomy, and 
therefore  subject  to  the  company  law  system  of  the  country  where  the 
multinational company is based. 
 
Theory has accepted the need to concentrate attention and awareness on the issue 
of corporate governance communication, in view of the growing complexity of the 
markets and the resulting need to develop integrated relational systems. 
On  the  other  hand,  institutions  and  professional  associations  have  limited 
themselves to providing the relevant documentary support – inasmuch as this is 
valid  –  (see  Borsa  Italiana,  Assonime,  etc.)  that  reveals  a  propensity  to  draw 
attention  to  the  parties  contributing  venture  capital,  overlooking  the  other 
categories of stakeholder
22. 
This  clearly  underlines  the  crucial  importance  of  the  chosen  communication 
policy, and the importance – acquired gradually as the environmental dynamics and 
complexity increase – of consistent integrated corporate communication, a policy 
that must consider the unavoidable multiplicity of dimensions that must be traced 
back to systemic criteria. 
This is confirmed by the fact that company strategies and policies are triggered by 
decisions  taken  by  the  economic  governance  organ  which,  like  other  company 
decisions, affect the organisation’s evolution. As a result, the business is a ‘vital 
system’
23  which  evolves  in  the  course  of  its  existence,  and  simultaneously 
contributes to the evolution of other (external) systems with which it establishes 
consonant and significant relationships, and which it cannot disregard. 
It is an ‘open system’, mutually dependent on the outside world, with which a 
series of relations are created, founded on interchange, phenomena and principles. 
In its turn, the environment acquires a structure and form that is linked directly to 
the  operations  of  an  individual  company;  basically,  an  observation  of  this 
environment and therefore of stakeholders with specific interests, will be directly 
correlated to the specific relations that it establishes with the company. 
An  analysis  of  the  strategies,  policies  and  behaviour  of  a  company  with  a 
widespread  shareholder  base,  which  is  listed  on  regulated  financial  markets, 
acquires particular significance when the same company is observed in relation to 
the influential systems and important systems with which it interacts. 
These observations are substantiated if we consider that, today, companies are 
only limited by physical-spatial boundaries (which are no longer conditioning as 
they were in the past), for example, manufacturing units or supply markets. But 
when  the  observation  becomes  systemic,  they  are  no  longer  confined  by  other 
boundaries, in other words the evolutionary dynamics of the system in which the 
companies interact is sustained. 
We  have  already  explained  that  integrated  corporate  communication  basically 
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1.  to establish the goal of reaching numerous categories of publics-targets as a 
priority; 
2.  to  disclose  a  variety  of  data  and  information,  offering  it  to  the  public  in 
different forms in order to create/maintain a relationship; 
3.  to  pursue  different  goals  (persuasive/commercial,  organisational, 
institutional), which imply that actions are ramified, but not that they have 
been adapted specifically to precise categories of target publics which would 
basically exclude some categories of stakeholders. 
 
We can also see that communication is charged with particular significance even 
during the preventive evaluation of stakeholders’ need for information. What is 
more, effective preventive communication can also make it possible to influence 
the system of relations that one intends to establish and maintain. 
The  company  is  offered  numerous  opportunities  to  fuel  a  simple  flow  of 
information or more complex communication with its publics regarding corporate 
governance. 
 




Source: adapted from Argenti P.A., Corporate Communication, McGraw-Hill/ Irwin, New York, 
2005 
 
Some documents are prepared to respect a precise legislative dictate, while others 
are  the  outcome  of  a  specific  corporate  decision,  consistent  with  the  corporate 
culture of each organisation. 
As we have just said, there are numerous opportunities to spread information or 
to  build  up  a  communicative  relationship.  The  Italian  legal  system  frequently 
identifies the documents precisely, even defining their contents in detail. 
For example, the documentation that accompanies the annual summary of results 
(statutory financial statements, board of auditors’ report, external auditors’ report, 
etc.). 
Other documents were recently introduced from specific legal systems, such as 
the ‘ethics code’ (where administrative accountability is concerned
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are created on the basis of recent developments of applications designed to analyse 
specific issues (i.e. reports on corporate aspects based on GRI logics). 
Discretionary documents on the other hand emerge from the specific sensitivity 
of each company, and as such they must be linked to considerations about their 
culture;  for  example,  the  ‘sustainability  report’,  the  ‘environmental  report’,  the 
‘social  report’  or  the  ‘intangibles  report’.  Figure  3)  lists  the  main  tools  of 
information/communication that a company is obliged to prepare and disseminate 
(with a certain degree of discretion). 
 
Figure 3: Communication Corporate Governance Tools  
 
Integrated Report 
Corporate Governance Report 
Financial Statements (annual, interim, consolidated) 
Board of Auditors’ Report 
External Auditors’ Report 
Interim Reports 
Ethics Code 
Behaviour Code (Internal Dealing) 





Gender Budgeting  
Information on relations between parent company and subsidiaries (e.g. joint venture agreements, 
purchases and sales of company branches and of significant investments, etc.) 
Information about meetings with market operators 
Press releases and interviews and declarations to the mass media 
Report on Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Source:  adapted  from  Brondoni  S.  M.,  Gnecchi  F.,  ‘Corporate  Governance  Communication’ 
Seminar, Milan-Bicocca University, October 2006 
 
We  cannot  overlook  the  fact  that  in  2004,  the  Organisation  for  Economic 
Cooperation and Development identified the fundamental principles on which a 
company’s  corporate  governance  systems  must  be  constructed,  developed  and 
structured: 
1.  guaranteeing the bases for effective company governance; 
2.  shareholders’ rights and fundamental functions associated to ownership of 
the shares; 
3.  impartial treatment of shareholders;  
4.  the role of stakeholders in corporate governance; 
5.  information and transparency; 
6.  the responsibilities of the board of directors. 
 
The  above  system  clearly  emerges,  evolves  and  is  consolidated  in  numerous 
different  contexts;  of  these,  information  and  communication  have  become 
extremely crucial activities, capable of influencing the relations between companies 






Edited by: ISTEI - University of Milan-Bicocca  ISSN: 1593-0319 
 
57 
Section V. of the Part One of the document distributed by the OECD in 2004
25, 
which establishes the principles of corporate governance, considers the issue of 
information and the transparency of corporate governance. In it we read that: ‘A 
strong  disclosure  regime  that  promotes  real  transparency  is  a  pivotal feature of 
market-based monitoring of companies and is central to shareholders’ ability to 
exercise their ownership rights on an informed basis. Experience in countries with 
large and active equity markets shows that disclosure can also be a powerful tool 
for influencing the behaviour of companies and for protecting investors. A strong 
disclosure regime can help to attract capital and maintain confidence in the capital 
markets. By contrast, weak disclosure and non-transparent practices can contribute 
to unethical behaviour and to a loss of market integrity at great cost, not just to the 
company and its shareholders but also to the economy as a whole. Shareholders and 
potential investors require access to regular, reliable and comparable information in 
sufficient  detail  for  them  to  assess  the  stewardship  of  management,  and  make 
informed  decisions  about  the  valuation,  ownership  and  voting  of  shares. 
Insufficient  or  unclear  information  may  hamper  the  ability  of  the  markets  to 
function, increase the cost of capital and result in a poor allocation of resources.’ 
Integrated  corporate  governance  communication  may  therefore  be  structured 
basically around three factors that qualify it: 
1.  documents that can be prepared and disseminated, which break down broadly 
into compulsory documents (those created to comply with a specific legal 
obligation)  and  discretionary  documents  (those  drafted  as  a  result  of  an 
autonomous corporate choice); 
2.  the systematic or (alternatively) sporadic nature of the information and/or 
communication flows, i.e. the chosen frequency; 
3.  the corporate culture and correlated corporate communication culture that 
qualifies each company. 
 
In addition to the quoted report that Assonime outlined in its document of 2004, 
mentioned in the previous note (and which, nonetheless, pays special attention to 
parties contributing venture capital), the annual integrated report is in our opinion 
the  most  effective  tool  for  corporate  governance  communication.  By  its  very 
nature,  this  document  pursues  the  goal  of  simplifying  and  systematising  any 
communication about specific objects that address specific publics, developing a 
degree  of  integration  that  qualifies  it  as  a  useful  tool  in  the  development  of 
complex relations. 
What  is  more,  from  a  systemic  viewpoint,  the  decision  to  separate  corporate 
governance  from  information  about  economic-equity-financial  operations, 
personnel  management,  action  to  protect  the  environment,  or  relations  with 
institutions, etc., might not be immediately comprehensible to people with a direct 
or indirect interest in the company. 
So it is necessary to emphasise the role of managers, or of so-called ‘technicians’, 
in the context of communication undertaken from the oft-mentioned stakeholder 
view  and  therefore  also  as  part  of  an  integrated  relationship.  Similarly,  these 
relations must be optimised, in order to achieve stakeholder satisfaction. And we 
can  also  note  that  not  infrequently,  larger  companies  equip  their  operating 
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even if they give them different names that only refer to specific aspects of these 







Argenti Paul A., Corporate Communication, McGraw-Hill/Irwin, New York, 2005. 
Berle Adolph, Means Gardiner, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, MacMillion, New 
York, 1932.  
Bresciani  Marco,  La  Corporate  Governance  nel  sistema  impresa:  prospettive  di  analisi  e 
relazionali, Giappichelli, Turin, 2003.  
Brondoni Silvio M., La comunicazione integrata in eccesso di offerta, Il Sole 24 Ore, 1/10/2002. 
Brondoni Silvio M, Global Markets and Market-Space Competition, Symphonya. Emerging Issues in 
Management (www.unimib.it/symphonya), n. 1, 2002. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4468/2002.1.03brondoni 
Brondoni  Silvio  M,  Network  Culture,  Performance  &  Corporate  Responsibility,  Symphonya. 
Emerging Issues in Management (www.unimib.it/symphonya), n. 1, 2003. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4468/2003.1.02brondoni 
Capasso  Arturo,  Assetti  proprietari  e  governo  d’impresa:  corporate  governance  e  risorse 
immateriali, Cedam, Padua, 1996. 
Cariola Alfio, La misurazione sistemica delle performance di impresa : il ruolo della corporate 
governance, Cedam, Padua, 2006. 
Castells Manuel, The Rise of the Network Society, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, 2005. 
Coda  Vittorio,  La  valutazione  della  formula  imprenditoriale,  Sviluppo  e  Organizzazione,  Crora-
Università Luigi Bocconi, n. 82, 1984. 
Coda Vittorio, Trasparenza informativa e correttezza gestionale: contenuti e condizioni di contesto, 
Scritti di economia aziendale in memoria di Raffaele D'Oriano, Tomo I, Cedam, Padua, 1997. 
Comoli Maurizio, I sistemi di controllo interno nella corporate governance, Egea, Milan, 2002. 
Corniani Margherita, Competitive Intelligence e organizzazioni Market-Driven, Silvio M. Brondoni 
(ed.), Il sistema delle risorse immateriali e concorrenza d’impresa: cultura d’impresa, sistema 
informativo e patrimonio di marca, Giappichelli, Turin, 2004. 
Costabile Michele, Il capitale relazionale, McGraw Hill, Milan, 2001. 
Damiani Mirella, Impresa e corporate governance, Carocci, Rome, 2006. 
Evans  Philip,  Wurster  Thomas  S.,  Blown  to  Bits:  How  the  New  Economics  of  Information 
Transforms Strategy, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 1999. 
Fortuna Fabio, Corporate governance: soggetti, modelli e sistemi, F. Angeli, Milan, 2001. 
Galbraith John K., La società opulenta, Universale Scientifica Boringhieri, Turin, 1972.  
Gandini Giuseppina, Corporate governance, controllo di gestione e risorse immateriali d’impresa, 
Daniela M. Salvioni (ed.), Corporate governance e sistemi di controllo della gestione aziendale, 
Franco Angeli, Milan, 2004. 
Gatti Mauro, Cultura d’impresa, risorse immateriali e competitività, Silvio M. Brondoni (ed.), Il 
sistema  delle  risorse  immateriali  e  concorrenza  d’impresa:  cultura  d’impresa,  sistema 






Edited by: ISTEI - University of Milan-Bicocca  ISSN: 1593-0319 
 
59 
Gnecchi Flavio, Corporate Governance nell’impresa a rete, Silvio M. Brondoni (ed.), Cultura di 
network Performance e Dinamiche competitive, Giappichelli, Turin, 2006. 
Golinelli  Gateano  M., L’approccio sistemico al governo dell’impresa, vol. I, L’impresa sistema 
vitale, Cedam, Padua, 2000. 
Golinelli Gaetano M., Gatti Mauro, The Firm as a Viable System, Symphonya. Emerging Issues in 
Management (www.unimib.it/symphonya), n. 2, 2000/2001. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4468/2001.2.04golinelli.gatti 
Harvard Business Review on Corporate Governance, Harvard Business School Press, Harvard, 2000  
Hitt Michael A., Ireland R. Duane, Hoshisson Robert E., Strategic Management: Competitiveness 
and Globalization, South Western College, Cincinnati, 2001. 
Hofstede Geert, Culture’s Consequences, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1980. 
Keasey Kevin, Thompson Mike, Wright Mark, Corporate Governance: Accountability, Enterprise 
and International Comparisons, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, 2005. 
Kim  Kenneth  A.,  Nofsinger  John  R.,  Corporate  Governance,  Pearson  Education,  Upper  Saddle 
River, 2004.  
Lambin Jean-Jacques, Schuiling Isabelle, Come competere nel nuovo ambiente globale?, Silvio M. 
Brondoni  (ed.),  Il  sistema  delle  risorse  immateriali  d’impresa:  cultura  d’impresa,  sistema 
informativo e patrimonio di marca, Giappichelli, Turin, 2004. 
Lambin Jean-Jacques, Marketing strategico e operativo, McGraw-Hill, Milan, 2004. 
Mallin Christine, Corporate Governance, Oxford University Press Inc, New York, 2004. 
Reboa Marco, Proprietà e controllo di impresa: aspetti di corporate governance, Giuffré, Milan, 
2002.  
Salvioni Daniela M., Il sistema di governo aziendale, D M. Salvioni (ed.), Corporate governance e 
sistemi di controllo della gestione aziendale, FrancoAngeli, Milan, 2004. 
Salvioni  Daniela  M.,  Corporate  Governance,  Management  Control  and  Global  Competition, 
Symphonya. Emerging Issues in Management (www.unimib.it/symphonya), n. 1, 2005. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4468/2005.1.03salvioni 
Salvioni  Daniela  M.,  Bosetti  Luisa,  Corporate  Governance  Report  and  Stakeholder  View, 
Symphonya. Emerging Issues in Management (www.unimib.it/symphonya), n. 1, 2006. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4468/2006.1.03salvioni.bosetti 
Sciarelli Sergio, Economia e gestione delle imprese, Cedam, Padua, 1997.  
Siano Alfonso, Comunicazione per la trasparenza e valori guida, Sinergie, CUEIM, Verona, n. 59, 
2003. 
Solomon  Aris,  Solomon  Jill,  Corporate  Governance  and  Accountability,  John  Wiley  &  Sons, 
Hoboken, 2003. 
Stiglitz Joseph E., La globalizzazione che funziona, Giulio Einaudi Editore, Turin, 2006. 
Stiglitz Joseph E., Economia e informazione, Datanews Editrice, Rome, 2006. 
Wearing Robert T., Cases in Corporate Governance, Sage, London, 2005. 
Zappa Gino, Le produzioni nell’economia delle imprese, Tomo I, Giuffrè, Milan, 1956/1957. 
 
                                                 
Notes 
 






Edited by: ISTEI - University of Milan-Bicocca  ISSN: 1593-0319 
 
60 
                                                                                                                                        
2 See K.A. Kim, J.R. Nofsinger, Corporate Governance, Pearson Education, Upper Saddle River, 
2004, pages 2/4. 
3 Cf. G. Zappa, Le produzioni nell’economia delle imprese, Book I, Giuffrè, Milan, 1956, p. 79. 
4  Cf.  V.  Coda,  Trasparenza  informativa  e  correttezza  gestionale:  contenuti  e  condizioni  di 
contesto,  in  Scritti  di  economia  aziendale  in  memoria  di  Raffaele  D'Oriano,  Book  I,  Cedam, 
Padova, 1997, p. 333. 
5 Cf. F. Gnecchi, Corporate Governance nell’impresa a rete, in Brondoni Silvio M. (ed.), Cultura 
di network Performance e Dinamiche competitive, Giappichelli, Turin, 2006. 
6 See K.A. Kim, J.R. Nofsinger, cit., p. 148. 
7 Cf. J.E. Stiglitz, La globalizzazione che funziona, Giulio Einaudi Editore, Turin, 2006, pp. 233 
and 234. 
8 According to the trickle-down view, a growing economy guarantees beneficial effects for all 
players. 
9 Cf. J.E. Stiglitz, Economia e informazione, Datanews Editrice, Rome, 2006, p. 70. 
10 Cf. J.K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society, 1972, pp. 36 and following. 
11  J.K.  Galbraith  himself  noted  that  ‘just  as  the  truth  helps  to  create  definitive  consensus,  so 
acceptability creates momentary consensus’, cit., p. 37. 
12 Cf. S.M. Brondoni, La comunicazione integrata in eccesso di offerta, Il Sole 24 Ore, October 1, 
2002. 
13 Cf. A. Solomon-J. Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability, John Wiley & Sons, 
Hoboken, 2003, p. 153.  
14 Cf. S.M. Brondoni, Network Culture, Performance & Corporate Responsibility, in Symphonya. 
Emerging Issues in Management, (www.unimib.it/symphonya), Issue 1, 2003, Milan. 
15 In this regard we refer you to the observations of M.A. Hitt-R.D. Ireland-R.E. Hoskisson, who 
stated that ‘understanding the corporate governance structure of the United Kingdom and the United 
States is inadequate for a multinational firm in today’s global economy. The Strategic Focus suggests 
that the governance systems in many countries have been affected by the realities of the global 
economy.  While  the  stability  associated  with  German  and  Japanese  governance  structures  has 
historically been viewed as an asset, some believe that it may now be a burden. And the governance 
in Germany and Japan is changing, just as it is in other parts of the world. As suggested in the 
Strategic Focus, the corporate governance systems are becoming more similar. These changes are 
partly  the  result  of  multinational  firms  operating  in  many  different  countries  and  attempting  to 
develop a more global governance system. While the similarity is increasing, differences remain 
evident, and firms employing an international strategy must understand these differences in order to 
operate effectively in different international market.’, Strategic Management. Competitiveness and 
Globalization Concepts, Thomson South-Western, Mason, 2005, pp. 325-327. 
16  V.  F.  Gnecchi,  op.  cit.;  in  this  regard  we  can  note  that  the  concerns  at  the  basis  of  the 
stakeholder  view  overcome  the  agency  problem,  an  issue  that  is  typically  correlated  to  the 
shareholder view, for which the separation of ownership and control has legitimated recourse to two 
coexisting but different systems: the remuneration and incentive system (based on the assumption 
that  shareholders’  well-being  is  correlated  to  that  of  managers)  and  the  system  that  verifies 
managers’ behaviour. 
17 Cf. D. Salvioni, Relazioni di Governance e Stakeholder View, with L. Bosetti, in Symphonya – 
Emerging Issues in Management, www.unimib.it/symphonya, Issue 1, ISTEI, Milan, 2006. 
18 F. Favotto, speech at the ‘Corporate Governance between interests and values’ Convention, 
Rome, Feb. 5,2002.  






Edited by: ISTEI - University of Milan-Bicocca  ISSN: 1593-0319 
 
61 
                                                                                                                                        
20 See the entire document http://www.sa-intl.org/document/docWindow.cfm?Fuseaction=docume 
nt.viewDocument&documentid=136&documentFormatId=244;  in  the  Italian  version  of  the 
document, the standard maintains its number (SA 8000), but the title ‘Social Accountability 8000’ 
becomes ‘Responsabilità Sociale’. With the result that the North American accountability becomes 
‘responsibility’ when applied to Italy. 
21 For example, the British government recommends designating a non-executive director charged 
with  attending  the  annual  meetings  between  management  and  major  shareholders,  as  well  as 
appointing another non-executive director, instead of a board member, to sit on the committee that 
appoints company officers. However, these two recommendations have caused serious concern in 
British top managers. 
22 We refer you to the Guida alla compilazione della Relazione sulla Corporate Governance, 
(Guide to compiling a Report on Corporate Governance) Assonime-Emittenti Titoli SpA February 
2004, the introduction to which points out that ‘greater disclosure increases a company’s reputation 
on  the  market  because  it  is  the  visible  manifestation  of  the  quality  of  its  governance  and  its 
management.  In  their  own  interest,  companies  must  substantially  implement  the  Code’s 
recommendations, avoiding recourse to formalism or cosmetic applications. 
In general, this Report cannot limit itself to a mere declaration of acceptance of the Code of self-
discipline as a whole and of the principles that inspire it (creation of value for shareholders, central 
role of BoD, etc.), nor can it just paraphrase the Code of self-discipline or divulge an internal Code 
of behaviour; it needs to explain how the company has applied the individual provisions of the Code. 
In line with the most significant foreign experience, the Instructions of Borsa Italiana envisage the 
obligation of an annual communication regarding the past operating year. However, it is useful to 
provide  timely  supplementary  information,  above  all  in  the  event  of  significant  changes  to  the 
company’s operating rules, after the Report has been communicated to the market. 
Moreover, it helps if the Report contains a paragraph that summarises events of significance to the 
organisation that have occurred after year-end: suitable attention must be focused on any changes to 
the composition of the BoD and/or committees. 
As well as their submission to Borsa Italiana, companies can use a wide range of ‘channels’ for 
their communications to the market, including the publication of informative material on their own 
websites. 
In particular: 
a)  financial  statements,  the  reports  that  accompany  financial  statements,  reports  on  corporate 
governance and other informative documents can be made available through the website; 
b) an English version of the documentation may also be made available; 
c) a special section of the website dedicated to corporate governance may be created, so that it is 
possible to immediately find the necessary information (it might also be useful to envisage a quick-
search  facility  that  simplifies  searches).  This  section  could  contain  all  the  documents  useful  to 
describe the company’s governance system (i.e. the Report, the Articles, summary information about 
shareholders, corporate officers and management, a summary of any shareholder agreements, AGM 
regulations,  Directors’  CVs,  Codes  of  Ethics,  Codes  of  Behaviour  for  internal  dealing  and  any 
communications that comply with the Code of Behaviour, etc.).  
23 Cf. G. M. Golinelli, L’approccio sistemico al governo dell’impresa, Vol. I, L’impresa sistema 
vitale, Cedam, Padova, 2000, page 55. 
24  Cf.  the  provisions  contained  in  Leg.  Decree  231  of  June  8,  2001,  ‘Regulations  for  the 
administrative  liability  of  legal  entities,  of  companies  and  association  with  or  without  legal 
personality, as per article 11 of Law no. 300 of September 29, 2000’. 
25 See ‘OECD Principles of corporate governance’, a document published by OECD in 2004. The 
principles have been approved by the Ministers representing their countries at this organisation in 
1999,  and  subsequently  updated  on  the  basis  of  the  work  of  the  Steering  Group  on  Corporate 
Governance. 
26 See K.A. Kim, J.R. Nofsinger, cit., p. 149. 